Agents Can Read Beyond the Repository
On 14 July 2026, I found Claude Code exploring my computer outside the repository I had given it. When an agent is missing context, it gets resourceful. Technically, it can walk up your file tree and into ~/.ssh.
A clearer prompt and sandbox mode help. But neither is a boundary: by default, sandboxes limit what an agent can write, not what it can read.
Sandboxes can offer granular access, which most developers do not configure. Even if they do, nuances can still let an LLM read the file system beyond the working directory.
- macOS permissions are coarse. Privacy permissions come in fixed folder categories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads) or Full Disk Access, granted to the host app and inherited by the agent. There is no per-directory allowlist.
- The sandboxes rest on a deprecated interface. Claude Code and Codex apply Seatbelt profiles on macOS through
sandbox-exec, which Apple marks as deprecated with no replacement for command-line processes (apple/containerization#737). - Working-directory-only reads are not the default. Both sandboxes bound writes and network by default, not reads, and they cover only what they wrap: shell commands in Claude Code, spawned commands and built-in file operations in Codex.
